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Abstract 
Covering the largest sample of countries to date, this study examines the effect of three 
country-specific factors on the tone of electoral campaigns across Europe: electoral system 
disproportionality, party system fragmentation and the polarization of the electorate. We use 
an original dataset of statements made by political actors during 18 electoral campaigns in 9 
European countries. Our multinomial logit model suggests that increasing disproportionality 
slightly increases negativity, while thanks to parties competing on the same market less 
polarized electorates invite more negative political campaigns. Finally, we find a U-shaped 
relationship between party system fragmentation and negativity: increasing the number of 
parties negativity decreases first, only to start increasing again once the party system becomes 
very fragmented. We explain this with parties altering their coalition strategies with the 
changing number of parties: less fragmentation makes it more likely to having to step into 
coalition with the competitors, thus decreasing negativity, while in very fragmented systems, 
parties not needed to any potential coalitions become easy targets to negative campaign. 
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Introduction 
Negative campaigning is considered a campaign technique that is built on attacking political 
competitors along the lines of their personality, views or performance. Although negative 
campaigning faces considerable criticism, it is considered a viable and regularly used strategy 
among political parties, and the literature discusses its effects a great deal. 
 
It has been shown that negative messages depress turnout (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995; 
Ansolabehere et al. 1994), reduce trust and interest in politics and increase cynicism (Cappella 
and Jamieson 1997), polarize voters (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995) and cause decline in 
campaign discourse (Jamieson 1992). On the other hand, there is also substantial evidence to 
the contrary (Lau, Sigelman et al. 2007). The literature suggests that the decline in turnout is 
not that severe as initially thought (Brooks 2006; Wattenberg and Brians 1999), the exposure 
to negative messages mobilizes voters (Brooks and Geer 2007; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; 
Jackson and Carsey 2007), and that negative messages are not only more informative than 
positive ones (Mark 2009), but they encourage voters to seek out additional information about 
the candidates (Marcus, Neuman et al. 2000). It seems that regarding its effects, negativity is 
neither specifically good nor bad, but it definitely influences various aspects of politics. 
Keeping this in mind, it is of great importance that we identify circumstances under which 
negative campaign prevails. 
 
The literature generally focuses on single-country cases, covering only one or few elections. 
Up to now, there have been very few comparative studies about negative campaigning, and 
existing work is typically restricted to a maximum of three counties (see for example 
Desposato 2008; Vliegenthart, Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Walter 2014). Additionally, despite 
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the fact that negativity is not only characteristic to the US, the vast majority of the studies 
address the issue of negative campaigning in the context of the US elections, which leads to a 
one-sided development of theories in the field (Walter 2014: 43). Due to the limited number 
of cases in the studies, authors rarely make inference on the effects of factors measured on the 
level of countries, such as party system characteristics or political system features.  
 
Thus, it remains unexploited, what is suggested by anecdotal evidence, namely that the tone 
of political campaigns shows considerable variation across countries: in some countries the 
dominant style of political communication is rather moderate, while in other countries a 
sharper style of communication prevails. The question is if these differences are systematic, or 
only occur by chance. This paper aims to fill this gap and tests if key country-level factors 
such as the disproportionality of the electoral system, party system fragmentation and the 
polarization of the electorate affect negativity. While answering the main question, our data 
also offers an opportunity to investigate if micro-level theories widely discussed in the 
literature can travel to political contexts outside the US. 
 
The reason for neglecting the country-level driving factors of negative campaigning lies most 
probably in the lack of comparative data: the construction of campaign datasets is extremely 
time and effort intensive, and data collection can hardly be carried out without – preferably – 
native country expert coders. The Comparative Campaign Dynamics Dataset (Debus, Somer-
Topcu et al. 2016) overcomes this obstacle by describing electoral campaigns based on a 
standardized coding scheme in nine European countries (the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom) at 
two elections each, covering the widest range of cases as of yet. The sample is sufficiently 
large to test not only party-, but system-level hypotheses, which strongly contributes to the 
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understanding of negative campaigning in a comparative context. Furthermore, as the dataset 
uses articles to get a picture of campaigns, we also obtain knowledge on the newspaper 
coverage of election campaigns with respect to the tone of political messages. This is 
particularly important, because voters are most likely to follow the campaign from the media, 
and thus media influences voting decisions by highlighting certain topics or tone, while 
smothering others. 
 
 
Negative campaigning 
Negative campaigning has long been considered an attractive strategy of gaining attention, 
media coverage and votes. In recent years, the increase in negativity is registered not only in 
the US (Fowler and Ridout 2013; Geer 2012; Jamieson, Waldman et al. 2000; Johnston and 
Kaid 2002), but worldwide too (Ceron and d’Adda 2016; Curini 2011; Momoc 2010; Sullivan 
2008; Sullivan 2009). Although voters may not find negativity appealing (Carraro, Gawronski 
et al. 2010; Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Jasperson and Fan 2002), and the evidence about the 
effectiveness of negative campaigns is mixed, there are some reasons for parties to apply this 
strategy. 
 
First of all, negative campaign messages are considered to be more memorable (Fridkin and 
Kenney 2011; Lau 1985; Perloff and Kinsey 1992). Secondly, they are sometimes the only 
tool for competitors to draw voter and media attention (Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013). Mark 
(2009) suggests that while incumbents might want to campaign with positive messages, 
challengers have no other choice but to criticize incumbent parties to point out the flaws in 
policies and offer alternatives. Thirdly, Mattes and Redlawsk (2015) argue that voters are not 
always negative about negativity. While personal attack is likely to backfire, voters accept 
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negativity about party programs or ideological positions (Carraro and Castelli 2010). Mark 
(2009) argues that if they are presented ‘in a factual manner’ voters value information on 
differences between parties, and establishing clear differences between competitors is easily 
done by applying negativity. Furthermore, contrary to positive messages (Mark 2009) by 
providing valuable information negative ads significantly lower the information cost of voting 
(Fridkin and Kenney 2011; Geer 2006; Mattes and Redlawsk 2015; Sullivan 2009). 
 
Anyhow, negative campaigning is a strategic decision based on its expected utility relative to 
the possible downsides (Peterson and Djupe 2005). The utility of such strategies often 
depends on institutions and the political context. Under certain circumstances, negative 
campaign tone pays off, while under different incentives parties have to refrain from attacking 
others.  
 
Moreover, while the communication strategy of the sender of a certain message is crucial, the 
tone of campaigns is also dependent upon how the media select and interpret party messages. 
Therefore, the level of negativity in a country is very well the function of some macro-level 
characteristics combined with party level features. Due to the lack of comparative data, 
however, when studying the determinants of negative campaigning, the literature discusses 
mostly micro-level (candidate, party and campaign-level) features, and country-level 
explanatory factors have remained out of the reach of investigation. Therefore, any study that 
wishes to theorize the effect of country-level factors on negative campaigning can only rely 
on very few comparative works and the often-contradicting results of single-country studies. 
 
 
The effect of country-level features on negative campaigning 
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The electoral system, and particularly its capacity to produce proportional results, is one of 
the most important features of a country’s political system that is interrelated to a fairly large 
number of institutional characteristics from the number and size of parties through the 
practice of governing in coalitions to eventually the type of democracy. Due to the dominance 
of single-country studies in the field, our knowledge about how electoral rules may affect 
campaign negativity is limited to say the least. 
 
The most important feature of majority electoral systems is that they ‘provide a winner’s 
bonus for the party in first place, while penalizing others’ (Norris 1997: 307), and sometimes 
leaving the supporters of small parties with no representation. It has been shown that in a 
majority electoral system, which is characterized by disproportional electoral results, a party 
winning 37.5 percent of the votes could secure the majority of seats in parliament, while in a 
PR system, it would need the 46.3 percent of the votes (Lijphart 1994; Norris 1997). These 
numbers suggest that not only can winners win big, but losers become also seriously 
underrepresented in majority systems. Under such circumstances, prospective winners and 
losers are both encouraged to pursue negative campaigns. The more disproportional the 
electoral system, the larger the benefit for winners, thus the more important it is for small 
parties to somehow lessen this advantage. Winners send negative messages on competitors to 
ensure majority in parliament in the first place, and to maximize this majority as a bonus. 
Losers instead (or small parties) must send negative messages to the voters on winners (or 
large parties) to lessen the winning margin of the latter, and decrease their own disadvantage 
that originates from disproportionality.. 
 
H1. Increasing electoral system disproportionality increases negativity in campaigning. 
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Moving on, parties have to take coalition strategies into account when setting the tone of their 
campaigns. As Walter and Van der Brug (2013) and Hansen and Pedersen (2008) highlight, in 
a multi-party context where coalition governments prevail, negative advertising might be 
beneficial to maximize votes, but it is not an effective office-seeking strategy. Going negative 
against prospective coalition partners is unproductive, as it makes the future cooperation 
difficult, and it reduces the chances of the sender to be included in a governing coalition. 
Moreover, multi-party contexts offer fewer incentives to use negativity. In a two-party 
system, negative campaign yields votes to the sender, or alternatively, decrease the 
mobilization potential of the competitor. However, in a multi-party system, demobilizing the 
target party’s voting base does not automatically guarantee a larger vote share (Hansen and 
Pedersen 2008; Ridout and Walter 2015; Walter and Van der Brug 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, the literature also makes a contradicting argument in connection with the effect 
of party system fragmentation. Evidence suggests that the higher the number of quality 
competitors (Peterson and Djupe 2005), and the more close the race, the more parties are 
willing to go negative (Desposato 2008; Hale, Fox et al. 1996; Wicks and Souley 2003). 
Others, on the other hand, find no evidence regarding fragmentation (Walter, Van der Brug et 
al. 2014). Based on these, we argue that the effect of party system fragmentation is not linear. 
To ensure the continuity of governance parties should minimize the potential for conflict 
within the coalition. All else being equal, the potential for conflict is the smallest with the 
smallest number of parties participating in the coalition that still has a stable majority. Thus, 
one could expect that the incentive for negativity decreases with the increasing number of 
parties in the party system only up to the point where it gets too fragmented to maintain stable 
coalitions. After this point, more parties produce more negativity, as there are more parties 
that are not needed in a coalition. 
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H2. Party system fragmentation decreases negativity when the number of parties in the party 
system is not particularly large, and increases negativity in the case of more fragmented party 
systems. 
 
The above two factors touch upon the features of the political system. However, campaigns 
may also align to certain characteristics of the electorate – which of course are hardly 
independent from political system features. Studies about the US recurrently find evidence to 
a growing level of polarization between Democrats and Republicans, and some scholars link 
increasing negative campaigning to growing ideological divisions (Geer 2006; Hetherington 
2008). Nevertheless, European democracies are characterized by multi-party competition, 
where the effect of polarization on negativity gets a spin. 
 
Spatial models of rational choice theory suggest that in less polarized political systems, 
parties are ideologically more similar than under more polarization simply because they have 
‘less space’ to spread across. For parties that have ideologically similar competitors, it is 
crucial to differentiate themselves from others; otherwise, it is difficult for voters to tell the 
difference between parties. If parties seem similar to voters, there is nothing keeping them 
from switching parties. In such situations, one option for parties to keep their voters away 
from competitors is to go negative against ideologically similar parties, to help establish an 
‘us and them’ narrative. Attacking competitors along valence characteristics creates a moral 
advantage, which can be crucial when there are otherwise little differences between parties 
(Carraro, Gawronski et al. 2010; Curini 2011; Curini and Martelli 2010). Thus, in countries 
where the electorate is not polarized, in other words, where parties have to compete for the 
votes of the same voters (Doron and On 1983), negativity is expected to increase. Conversely, 
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with increasing polarization, the market for votes spreads out which makes negativity 
unnecessary as there is no overlap between the ‘hunting grounds’ of the competing parties. 
 
Using data from Dutch electoral campaigns Walter (2012) shows that ideologically proximate 
parties are indeed more likely targets of negative messages, and Curini (2011) comes to 
similar conclusions analyzing data from Italy and Japan. Thus, we argue that in a European 
context characterized by multi-party competition the prevalence of negativity is lower in 
ideologically more polarized countries.  
 
H3. The likelihood of negativity decreases with increasing polarization. 
 
 
Data and variables 
The analysis relies on a content analysis of newspaper articles covering a one-month period 
before the national elections in nine European countries. Consequently, it focuses on a period 
of intense campaigning and high media attention on politics. The data is taken from the 
Comparative Campaign Dynamics Dataset (Debus, Somer-Topcu et al. 2016), which codes a 
text corpus that includes front page articles and a random 5% sample of all election related 
articles (but at least 60) from a right- and a left-leaning daily newspaper in each participating 
country. Newspapers are selected by teams of country-experts. The sample covers nine 
countries, 18 elections and 1128 articles, and includes elections between 2005 and 2014. 
Table 1 contains the list of participating countries, elections and newspapers. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Articles were independently coded by native undergraduate and graduate students, three in 
each country. Coding units were statements that parties made about themselves and their 
competitors. Each article was coded as many times as there were parties mentioning other 
parties or themselves in the article. Following the classification of Stokes (1963: 373), 
statements were categorized into two groups. While ‘position issues’ include policy-related 
statements about the target party’s policy positions, pledges or decisions, ‘valence 
evaluations’ are non-policy-related or unspecified evaluations about the competence, 
performance, integrity, honesty, etc. of the targeted party or politician. 
 
To ensure reliability, coders were asked to indicate how confident they were about their 
coding decisions by using a scale of ‘fully confident’, ‘somewhat confident’ or ‘not 
confident’. The final dataset only includes statements which have been (1) unanimously coded 
by the three coders regardless the level of confidence in their coding decisions, (2) 
unanimously coded by two coders who were at least ‘somewhat confident’ in their decisions, 
and (3) coded by one coder who was ‘fully confident’ in her coding decision. For more details 
on the data see Baumann and Gross (2016). 
 
 
Dependent variable 
In our paper we test the effects of electoral system disproportionality, party system 
fragmentation and the polarization of the electorate on campaign negativity. The dependent 
variable (DV) Statement tone is measured on a nominal scale and differentiates between (1) 
negative, (2) neutral and (3) positive tones. Negative and positive tones indicate negative or 
positive evaluations about the target. Neutral tone is used when the party/politician mentioned 
another political actor or itself without any evaluating statement, or when the direction of the 
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statement was not clearly detectable. 46.8 % of all the statements are negative, 19.4 % neutral 
and 33.8 % positive. For the country-level distribution of statement tone see Appendix 1. Out 
of the nine countries in our sample, parties in Denmark and Germany pursue the least 
negative campaigns, , while the proportion of negative statements was the largest in the cases 
of Hungary, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In some countries, the prevalence of 
negativity considerably varies from one election to the other: the difference between the share 
of negative statements at the two elections exceeds 10 percent points both in Hungary and 
Poland. 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
First, to measure the disproportionality of the electoral system we use the Gallagher index, 
which shows the aggregate difference between votes cast for the parties and the number of 
seats the parties won in parliament. The index ranges from 0 to 100, where larger numbers 
indicate more disproportionality. This variable is borrowed from the Comparative Political 
Data Set (CPDS, Armingeon et al. 2016). Second, to control for party system fragmentation 
we include the CPDS variable on the effective number of parties at the elections calculated 
based on Laakso and Taagepera (1979). To account for the non-linear effect of this variable 
we include its squared form into our model. Third, to measure the polarization of the 
electorate, we utilize the left-right variable (0-10) from the European Social Survey 
(Norwegian Centre for Research Data 2004), and calculate the distance of medians of left- (0 
– 4) and right-wing (6 – 10) blocks in each country. Respondents who put themselves to the 
middle (5) are excluded. 
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Pearson correlation coefficients reveal only moderate relationships between the independent 
variables. As one can expect, the correlation between the effective number of parties and 
electoral system disproportionality is the largest (r = – 0.39; p = 0.00), but still not 
substantial
1
. The relationship between the effective number of parties and the polarization of 
the electorate is also significant, but remains at a very low level (r = 0.06; p = 0.00). Finally, 
there is no significant connection between electoral system disproportionality and polarization 
(r = –0.01; p = 0.09). 
 
As shown by Appendix 3, the values of the independent variables vary both across countries 
and – to a smaller extent – elections within countries. The most fragmented party systems, are 
the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, while the 2011 Danish election also scored in the 
highest quartile (>5.68). Additionally, the effective number of parties is higher than the 
average in Germany (both elections), Denmark in 2007 and the 2014 Swedish election. As to 
the disproportionality of the electoral system, it is no surprise that the UK’s first-past-the-post 
system scored the highest. Both mixed-member systems, Germany and Hungary produced 
relatively disproportional results in 2013 and 2010 respectively. Interestingly, these systems 
show also the largest level of fluctuations: in both countries, the results of the other election 
(2009 and 2006) in the sample are considerably more proportional, not even reaching the 
mean value of the index (5.6). In the case of the polarization of the electorate, we do not see 
big differences within countries. The electorates of the three Eastern European countries (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) are the most polarized along the left-right scale, but 
Sweden scores also above the average (>4.56). 
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Control variables 
To be able to show the net effect of macro-level factors, we include several control variables 
into our model. We control for the ‘usual suspects’ of the literature and for variables that are 
specific to our data. When studying the determinants of negative campaigning, the literature 
discusses mostly micro-level (candidate, party and campaign-level) features. Micro-level 
factors are generally broken down into sender and target level characteristics. Sender level 
characteristics are features of parties who use negativity as a campaign tool, while target level 
characteristics are properties of parties who get attacked by negative messages. In our article, 
the focus is on the circumstances under which parties may opt for negativity. As our questions 
concern the behavior of the ‘active participant’, and not the target of negativity, we take only 
contextual and sender level variables into account. 
 
First and foremost, we control for whether the statement was made about another party (0-1). 
Additionally, we include government status (0 – challenger, 1 – government). The literature 
suggests that incumbents tend to focus on the achievements of the previous electoral term, 
while challengers try to point out the flaws of incumbents (see among others Elmelund-
Præstekær 2010; Hale, Fox et al. 1996; Nooy and Kleinnijenhuis 2013; Sullivan and Sapir 
2012; Theilmann and Wilhite 1998; Walter 2012). Party size is measured with the share of 
seats the party held at the previous parliament. Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) argues that 
small parties are more likely to attack large ones, while others find no effect (Nooy & 
Kleinnijenhuis, 2013; Walter & Van der Brug, 2013). A further important factor in the 
literature is time until the election. It is argued that with the elections approaching the 
incentive to go negative increases (Damore, 2002; Haynes & Rhine, 1998). 
 
We also control for the parties’ ideological positions, measured on a left-right scale (0 – 10), 
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the newspapers’ political leaning (0 – left, 1 – right), and statement type (0 – valence on a 
policy issue, 1 – valence evaluation). On the country-level we control for the levels of 
corruption (using corruption perception index of Transparency International) and economic 
performance (using the unemployment rate variable from CPDS)
2
, as high corruption and low 
economic performance might foster negativity. To capture differences in political culture we 
control for the region of the country (0 – Western, 1 – Eastern Europe). Information on 
government status, party size and party ideology come from the Parliaments and 
Governments (Döring and Manow 2016) dataset. For the full list of variables see Appendix 2. 
 
 
Analysis 
To test the effects of the independent variables on statement tone we use logit regression with 
multinomial outcome (negative, neutral and positive statements) applying country-clustered 
standard errors
3
. The control category for the dependent variable is negative tone. Results of 
our main model are shown in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Taking a look at the predicted probabilities, all variables set to their means, the probability of 
a statement being negative is 0.62 as opposed to 0.06 and 0.32 in the cases of neutral and 
positive ones respectively. It is no surprise that the probability of negative messages is 
significantly larger in the case of parties targeting others (0.9) than parties talking about 
themselves (0.1). 
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Looking at the effect of electoral system disproportionality (H1) moving from the most 
proportional end of the scale (Denmark in 2007) toward more disproportional systems (the 
UK in 2005), the probability of negativity slightly increases from 0.59 to 0.63 (see Figure 1). 
Oddly, the same can be observed in the case of positive messages: the probability increases 
from 0.28 to 0.35. The probability of neutral messages on the other hand decreases from 0.12 
to 0.1 between the two ends of the disproportionality scale. Based on this, and the results of 
Table 2 (namely that there is a significant difference only between negative and neutral 
statement tone), it seems that parties in countries with more proportional electoral systems 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands or Sweden consider neutrality as the alternative of 
negative: while parties in countries with disproportional electoral rules (the UK, Hungary in 
2010, the Czech Republic) tend to go positive about themselves, proportional electoral 
systems keep parties neutral in this regard
4
. Although these changes are by no means 
considerable, the direction of the effects supports our first hypothesis. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
As to our second hypothesis, namely the non-linear (U-shaped) effect of party system 
fragmentation on the likelihood of negativity, results appear to support our argument. 
Disentangling the effect of the squared term Figure 2 shows that negativity decreases with 
increasing fragmentation only to a point, from where it starts to increase. In the first segment 
of the graph, the level of negativity is relatively high. Looking at the level of fragmentation, 
these are elections where one-party governments are likely to be formed. Here we find 
countries such as the UK, Hungary and Portugal in 2009. As fragmentation increases, – and 
with that the likelihood of setting up a one-party government decreases –, the probability of 
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sending negative messages decreases. Countries like Poland, Sweden and Denmark in 2007 
fall onto this part of the graph. 
 
On the second part of the figure, the effect of excess fragmentation on negativity shows that 
once there are too many parties competing, negativity again becomes an inviting tool. The 
Czech Republic, Denmark in 2011, Germany in 2009, and the Netherlands have particularly 
fragmented party systems allowing for a larger level of negativity according to our model. 
The turning point is at an average value around 5.5 parties. This means, that regarding our 
sample, in party systems where the effective number of parties at the elections is larger than 
this value, an additional party in the party system will increase the probability of negative 
messages. However, in party systems with a lower number of parties, an extra party causes 
negativity to decrease. In light of our argument this also implies that in party systems with a 
higher number of parties than 5.5, the possibility that a party is not needed in the coalition 
increases, removing the incentive for parties to moderate their campaigns in fear of creating 
conflict with potential coalition partners. The changes in the probabilities of negativity are 
also quite substantial. Its value between party systems with 2.7 and 5.5 players drops from 0.7 
to 0.53, from where it increases up to 0.63 at the most fragmented end of the scale. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
With regards to our third hypothesis, polarization makes a difference in choosing between 
positive and negative campaign messages, and the effect points to the expected direction. As 
Figure 3 suggests, increasing polarization decreases negativity while it increases the 
occurrence of positive statements. The probability of negativity decreases from 0.66 to 0.48 in 
the case of the least (the Netherlands in 2010) and most polarized (Hungary in 2010) 
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countries, while positive statements are considerably more likely in the case of maximum 
polarization (prob. = 0.45) than at the lowest end of the scale (prob. = 0.27). Thus, the role of 
polarization in European parties’ campaign strategy is in line with the prediction of rational 
models (Doron and On 1983), namely that smaller polarization (i.e. parties competing on the 
same market) encourages parties to attack each other to differentiate themselves from 
ideologically similar competitors. This is just the opposite of what has been found in the US, 
where polarization and negativity increase hand in hand (Geer 2006).  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
The connection between the region (Eastern vs, Western Europe) and polarization is 
substantial (r = 0.88, p = 0.000), which raises the problem of disturbing multicollinearity in 
the model. Indeed, the VIF value for the region exceeds 10, the commonly argued threshold 
of collinearity. Nested models suggest that the direction of the effects are not sensitive to 
removing or including the region variable into the model. However, the significance of the 
effect of polarization vanishes in the model with region when estimating the difference 
between the probabilities of a statement being negative or neutral. Nevertheless, predicted 
probabilities do not change to an extent to alter conclusions. We checked also the relationship 
between the changes in polarization and negativity per country from one election to the next. 
Although the sample size becomes tiny, resulting in a statistically insignificant relationship, 
the correlation coefficient corroborates the results of our models (r = -0.447, p = 0.227), that 
is, when polarization increases, negativity tends to decrease. In other words, although 
polarization and regionality are strongly correlated in our sample, the results on polarization 
are unlikely to be driven by the effect of the Eastern vs. Western divide. Therefore, as we 
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consider the region variable vital in explaining the differences in negativity, we decided to 
present models that include both variables.  
 
Turning to the ‘usual suspects’ of the literature, government status, party size and time until 
the election are not significant. Being in government decreases the probability of negative 
statements only by 0.01 (from 0.62 to 0.61). As to party size, a 10 seat gain during the 
previous parliament increases the probability of negativity by 0.01, which again does not 
corroborate the results of single country studies. Finally, with every five days with which the 
elections get closer the occurrence of negativity becomes 0.05 points less likely. 
 
Additionally, we find that statements about policy issues are more likely to be negative than 
those regarding general valence content, and, last but not least, Eastern European parties 
prefer neutral tone as opposed to negative messages. The perceived level of corruption and the 
unemployment rate do not play any role in setting the tone for the campaign. To sum up, our 
results do not offer support for the majority of usual suspects in the literature. To further 
elaborate on this claim, we ran multinomial logit models separately for each country. 
Appendix 4 visualizes the effects of the party- and statement-level variables on the probability 
of making a negative statement. First, the government status of the sender party is only 
significant in about half of the country-cases. In one case (the Czech Republic), the effect is 
positive indicating that Czech government parties are more likely to go negative than the 
opposition. Additionally, we also see a positive effect in Sweden, although the Swedish 
results must be handled with care due to estimation problems. In the remaining significant 
cases (Germany, Hungary and Poland), the effect of government status is as expected. And 
finally, dismissing two popular hypotheses of the literature, in all countries, neither party size 
nor the closeness of the election have any effect on negativity,  
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Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to show that countries vary regarding the negativity of electoral 
campaigns, and the differences can be accounted to various country-level features, such as 
electoral system disproportionality, party system fragmentation and the polarization of the 
electorate. We used a unique dataset of statements made by political actors before the 
elections in 18 electoral campaigns in nine European countries. We applied a multinomial 
logit model to explain the tone of the statements made by political actors reported in leading 
daily newspapers. Our dependent variable distinguished between positive, neutral and 
negative tone. We found that country-level factors indeed affect the probability of campaigns 
going negative. In line with our hypotheses, firstly, the likelihood of negativity increases with 
the increasing disproportionality of electoral results. However, although significant, the effect 
size is rather moderate. Secondly, negativity in campaigns decreases with increasing 
fragmentation only to take a U-turn and start to increase in countries with excess 
fragmentation. Thirdly, in countries with less polarized electorates political actors are more 
likely to campaign with negative statements to increase perceived differences between 
essentially similar competitors. 
 
As to micro-level factors, we found no support for the literature’s results with regards to the 
effects of ‘usual suspects’. These insignificant results hardly change when running the models 
separately for the different countries. Although it was not the focus of our article, these results 
suggest being very cautious when building theory based on evidence found in single-case 
studies, and especially when generalizing American results to European multi-party contexts. 
This implies that connections between a wide range of variables and negativity rest upon the 
context of the campaigns. Furthermore, it is very important to note that our results may be 
20 
 
different than those published on the ‘usual suspects’ by the reason of using data generated 
from newspaper articles, instead of messages directly coming from parties. At last, although 
macro-level variables significantly change the occurrence of negative messages, we must 
stress that this does not change the picture in the absolute sense. While its level is dependent 
on a wide range of factors, negativity remains the dominant tone of political campaigns. 
 
As in the case of all empirical work, our study has also its limitations. Most importantly, the 
choice of analyzing newspaper articles is crucial in evaluating our results. First, besides the 
original party message, the tone and content of an article is strongly influenced by the 
selection and interpretation of news, thus our results reflect the characteristics of party 
messages and the media at the same time. As former research has shown, the amount of 
negativity differs between communication channels, and newspapers especially tend to give 
priority to negative news over positive or neutral ones (Hansen and Pedersen 2008; Walter 
and Vliegenthart 2010). On a positive note, however, getting a picture of the newspaper 
coverage of campaigns also brings us closer to voter perceptions of these campaigns, which 
perceptions arguably influence their decisions at the ballot box to a greater extent than 
messages coming directly from parties. Second, as television and the internet are shown to 
reach a larger number of voters, these two sources also need attention in the future. Finally, 
mainstream media might discriminate niche parties, which introduces bias into the sample. 
 
To conclude, while we could not confirm some currently popular assumptions about micro-
level factors, our results point to a solid effect of country-level variables on negative 
campaigning. Therefore, it is well grounded to investigate the topic from a comparative 
perspective in the future, and to focus on the institutional determinants of negative 
campaigning. 
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Table 1. The list of participating countries, elections and newspapers 
Country Election years Daily newspapers 
Czech Republic 2010 2013 Mladá fronta Dnes Právo 
Denmark 2007 2011 Jyllands-Posten Politiken 
Germany 2009 2013 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Hungary 2006 2010 Magyar Nemzet Népszabadság 
Netherlands 2010 2012 De Telegraaf de Volkskrant 
Poland 2007 2011 Gazeta Wyborcza Rzeczpospolita 
Portugal 2009 2011 Jornal de Notícias Público 
Sweden 2010 2014 Aftonbladet Dagens Nyheter 
United Kingdom 2005 2010 The Guardian The Daily Telegraph 
Source: (Baumann and Gross 2016, 8) 
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Table 2. Multinomial logistic regression model explaining statement tone 
  
Neutral tone 
(Reference: negative 
tone) 
Positive tone 
(Reference: negative 
tone) 
  B SE B SE 
Party system fragmentation 4.839* (1.985) 1.696** (0.626) 
Party system fragmentation^2 -0.445* (0.195) -0.147* (0.061) 
Polarization 0.686 (1.246) 1.302*** (0.357) 
Disproportionality of electoral system -0.16** (0.053) 0.004 (0.02) 
Controls 
Mentions other party -3.487*** (0.297) -4.792*** (0.349) 
Time until the elections -0.009 (0.008) -0.013 (0.012) 
Valence issue 0.987*** (0.151) 0.111 (0.128) 
Government party -0.212 (0.233) 0.23 (0.268) 
Ideological position 0.035 (0.042) -0.032 (0.055) 
Party size -0.005 (0.005) -0.01** (0.003) 
Right-leaning newspaper 0.019 (0.084) 0.092 (0.123) 
Eastern Europe 1.564 (1.194) -1.07** (0.612) 
Corruption Perception Index -0.192 (0.262) -0.124 (0.144) 
Unemployment rate 0.101 (0.132) -0.013 (0.06) 
Constant -15.072* (7.011) -6.764** (2.258) 
N 6238 
Pseudo R2 0.456 
Log-pseudolikelihood -2850.12 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05 
Dependent variable: statement tone (1 = negative, 2 = neutral, 3 = positive) 
Entries are multinomial logistic regression coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered for 9 
countries in parentheses. 
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of statement tone in light of electoral system proportionality 
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Figure 2. The predicted probability of negative tone in light of party system fragmentation 
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Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of negative tone in light of the polarisation of the electorate 
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Appendix 1. The distribution of statement tone in each country 
Country Election 
Negative 
(%) 
Neutral 
(%) 
Positive 
(%) 
Czech Republic 2010 50.89 16.26 32.85 
Czech Republic 2013 42.9 18.23 38.87 
Denmark 2007 33.81 32.23 33.96 
Denmark 2011 39.57 25.12 35.3 
Germany 2009 42.21 24.77 33.02 
Germany 2013 36.66 20.33 43.01 
Hungary 2006 61.22 11.48 27.3 
Hungary 2010 48.06 15.52 36.42 
Poland 2007 51.97 23.38 24.65 
Poland 2011 38.03 33.59 28.38 
Portugal 2009 46.25 19.43 34.32 
Portugal 2011 49.39 13.6 37.01 
Sweden 2010 44.38 19.24 36.38 
Sweden 2014 46.15 14.27 39.58 
The Netherlands 2010 54.42 20.23 25.35 
The Netherlands 2012 54.07 11.18 34.76 
United Kingdom 2005 54.63 15.13 30.25 
United Kingdom 2010 55.21 11.33 33.46 
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Appendix 2. The list of variables in the analysis 
 Description Source of data if 
external 
Dependent variable   
Statement tone 1 = negative, 2 = neutral, 3 = positive  
   
Independent variables   
Disproportionality of 
electoral system 
Gallagher-index of electoral system disproportionality CPDS 
Party system 
fragmentation 
The Laasko – Taagepera number of effective parties  CPDS 
Polarization The difference in medians of the ideological position of left-wing and right wing camps in each 
country. We excluded who put themselves to 5 on a 0 to 10 scale, and then calculated the 
difference between the median positions of those between 0 to 4 (left-leaning respondents) and 6 
to 10 (right-leaning respondents). 
Own calculations 
using ESS data 
   
Controls   
Mentions other party 0 = sender mentions itself, 1 = sender mentions another party  
Government party 0 = not government, 1 = government party ParlGov 
Party size Share of seats the party held at the previous parliament ParlGov 
Time until the elections Number of days left until the election  
35 
 
Ideological position Position of the party on the left (0) - right (10) scale ParlGov 
Right-leaning 
newspaper 
0 = left, 1 = right  
Valence issue Type of statement, 0 = issue valence, 1 = valence evaluation  
Eastern Europe 0 = Western European, 1 = Eastern European country  
Corruption perception Corruption Perception Index scores divided by 10 Transparency 
International 
Unemployment Unemployment rate, percentage of civilian labour force CPDS 
 
36 
 
 
Appendix 3. The values of independent variables across country-elections 
 
Country Election 
Party system 
fragmentation 
Electoral system 
disproportionality Polarization 
Czech Republic 2010 6.76 8.67 4.97 
Czech Republic 2013 7.62 5.95 5.23 
Denmark 2007 5.4 0.35 4.46 
Denmark 2011 5.72 0.45 4.39 
Germany 2009 5.59 3.18 4.1 
Germany 2013 4.82 7.77 4.25 
Hungary 2006 2.7 4.87 5.14 
Hungary 2010 2.87 11.92 5.64 
Poland 2007 3.33 4.41 4.87 
Poland 2011 3.74 5.85 4.91 
Portugal 2009 3.84 5.58 4.1 
Portugal 2011 3.67 5.58 4.45 
Sweden 2010 4.78 1.11 4.56 
Sweden 2014 5.41 2.61 4.57 
Netherlands 2010 6.99 0.61 4.07 
Netherlands 2012 5.97 0.74 4.11 
United Kingdom 
2005 3.6 16.64 4.11 
United Kingdom 2010 3.73 14.59 4.22 
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Appendix 4. Marginal effects of party- and statement-level variables across the nine countries 
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Note: The graph displays the marginal effects point estimations and 5 % confidence intervals 
from the multinomial logit regressions for each country. Standard errors are clustered by 
election. Variables on the graph: V1 – Mentioning other parties, V2 – Government party, V3 
– Left-right scale, V4 – Party size, V5 – Right-leaning newspaper, V6 – Time until the 
election, V7 – Valence statement 
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1
 Although one might suspect that including both the effective number of parties at the election and the electoral 
system disproportionality into the model could cause disturbing multicollinearity, this is not the case. Both, VIF 
values (1.33 for the effective number of parties and 1.39 for electoral system disproportionality) and nested 
models suggest that the two variables do not inflate standard errors enough to mask significant results. In 
addition, coefficients in the nested models point to the same direction as in the full model. 
2
 It has previously been argued that among factors of economic performance, citizens have the most accurate 
perception about the unemployment rate (Paldam and Nannestad 2000). 
3
 As a robustness check, we also estimated multilevel multinomial logit regression using the gsem function of 
Stata to account for the hierarchical structure of the data. Statements and countries constitute the two levels in 
the multilevel structure. We assumed shared random effects, meaning that we allow the country-level intercepts 
to vary, but the effect sizes remain the same across all countries. Results are identical both in terms of the 
significance of the variables and the effects sizes. For the sake of simplicity, and because the multilevel structure 
does not seem to change the results we present the results of the single-level models. 
4
 These conclusions are supported by a model in which an interaction of electoral system disproportionality and 
whether parties mention other parties in their statements is controlled for. 
